Michigan Law Review
Volume 55

Issue 5

1957

Patents - Licensing - Legality of Grant-Back Clauses
Eric E. Bergsten S.Ed.
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the
Litigation Commons

Recommended Citation
Eric E. Bergsten S.Ed., Patents - Licensing - Legality of Grant-Back Clauses, 55 MICH. L. REV. 697 (1957).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol55/iss5/5

This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1957]

COMMENTS

697

p ATENTS - LICENSING - LEGALITY OF GRANT-BACK CLAUSES There is no authoritative definition of the term "patent grantback."1 It has been defined as a clause in a patent license which
provides "for license or assignment to the licensor of any improvement patented by the licensee in the products or processes of the
licensed patent."2 In litigated cases grant-back clauses usually appear either in basic patent licenses or in licenses of the products or
processes of an industry which the licensor dominates through control of a multitude of overlapping patents.

Relation to Patent Misuse
In 1946 in Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes &- Smith
Co. (Trans Wrap J3 the question of the criteria to be used in evaluating the legality of an improvement patent grant-back was clearly
raised for the first time. The Supreme Court held that though
grant-back clauses can easily be used to violate the antitrust laws,
they are not illegal per se as a patent misuse.
In the TransWrap case the vendor, in connection with the sale
of a business, exclusively licensed its patents to the vendee. One
clause in the license required the vendee to submit to the vendor
any patentable ideas so that the vendor could take out improvement patents if it so desired. The vendee was permitted to use the
improvement patents in connection with both the basic patents
and on any non-competing product without additional charge.
The vendee failed to submit its improvements to the vendor. When
the vendor then elected to terminate the license, the vendee sued
for a declaratory judgment that the grant-back clause was contrary
to public policy and unenforceable.
Prior to 1946 grant-back clauses occasionally appeared in litigated cases but in no case was the clause found to be illegal.4 In
1 In several cases the term reciprocal licenses has been used to cover what is here
meant by "patent grant-back."
2 REPORT OF TilE ATIORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITI"EE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws 227 (1955), hereinafter referred to as REPORT. This comment deals only
with grant-backs in bilateral licenses. For patent pool agreements containing grant-backs,
see, e.g., United States v. Besser Mfg. Co., (E.D. Mich. 1951) 96 F. Supp. 304, affd. 343 U.S.
444 (1952); Cutter Laboratories v. Lyophile-Cryochem Corp., (9th Cir. 1949) 179 F. (2d)
80; United States v. Associated Patents, Inc., (E.D. Mich. 1955) 134 F. Supp. 74, noted
in 54 MICH. L. REv. 713 (1956); United States v. Birdsboro Steel Foundry and Machine
Co., (W.D. Pa. 1956) 139 F. Supp. 244.
3 329 U.S. 637 (1947).
4Allbright-Nell Co. v. Stanley Hiller Co., (7th Cir. 1934) 72 F. (2d) 392; Gasoline
Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., (D.C. Me. 1931) 46 F. (2d) 511; Bunker v.
Stevens. (C.C. N.J. 1885) 26 F. 245; American Refining Co. v. Gasoline Products Co.,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1927} 294 S.W. 967.
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1945 the Supreme Court in Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States5
approved a decree which, inter alia, enjoined the defendants from
inserting a grant-back clause in licenses of glassware and glassmaking equipment patents but the Court disallowed that portion of the
decree which would have extended the injunction to the other
patents held by the defendants. The Court felt that the broad
prohibitions of the district court decree, only one of which was the
grant-back injunction, if applied to all of the defendants' patents,
would have had a tendency to stop all inventions or acquisitions of
patents in any field by the defendants, a result not desired by the
Court. The decree would have set such important limitations upon
the reward which could have been secured by the defendants from
the ownership of patents as to make the defendants' patents practically worthless. 6 Since Hartford-Empire was primarily a licensing
rather than a manufacturing company, a patent was of little value
to the defendants if it could not be effectively licensed.
The trial court found that the grant-back clause was lawful
throughout and not within the doctrine of the misuse cases.7 The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit speaking through Judge
Learned Hand (Judge Swan dissenting) felt that the vendor had
used its basic patent monopoly to force others to buy from it things
outside of the four walls of the patent.8 It relied primarily on the
fact that after the expiration of the basic patent, the vendor would
have the control over the improvement patents that the vendee
would have had. The result of this argument, based on the misuse
cases, is that an assignment grant-back is illegal per se.
The Supreme Court disagreed. 9 The patent statute expressly
permits the assignment of patents and places no restrictions on the
consideration for such assignment.10 The effect on the improvement patentee is the same whether he assigns for a monetary consideration or whether the consideration is the right to use the basic
patent. The court then conceded that though a patentee has the
right to refuse a license he cannot demand an unlawful condition.
The court found that a grant-back clause did not constitute an
unlawful condition because the patent laws already recognized the
15 323

U.S. 386 (1945).
Id. at 423, 424.
7 Stokes & Smith Co. v. Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp., (S.D. N.Y. 1945) 68
U.S.P.Q. 28.
s Stokes & Smith Co. v. Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp., (2d Cir. 1946) 156 F.
(2d) 198.
9 Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947).
10 66 Stat. 810 (1952), 35 U.S.C. (1952) §261.
6
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monopoly right in the improvement patent. The basic patentee
was using his property to acquire a lawful monopoly. The misuse
doctrine does not apply where the patent monopoly is used to
acquire other lawful monopolies. It exists only where the patent
monopoly is used to control activities outside of any legalized monopoly. Therefore, since the grant-back provision is not a patent
misuse and since the patent statute expressly recognizes the right
of a patentee to assign his patents without regard to the consideration, a patent grant-back clause is not illegal per se.
This decision effectively cut off any further judicial discussion
of a patent grant-back as a patent misuse as such. However, even
at this late date it may be worthwhile to examine this phase of the
decision.
If the problem presented by this case is analyzed as a question
of the enforcement of a promise to assign improvement patents for
which the consideration is the right to use certain basic patents,
then there seems to be no choice but to say with the court that the
promise to assign improvements is legal per se and the consideration is both adequate and legal. However, if this is analyzed as a
license of a basic patent in partial consideration for which a promise to assign improvement patents is given, it would seem that we
must still see whether the grant-back would constitute a patent
misuse. The enforcement of the promise would give the licensor
control over other articles which, but for the patent, he would not
possess. In prior misuse cases this control was over unpatented
articles.11 The Court, however, seemed to feel that if a monopoly
has been legally established in one limited area, it is no longer
in the public interest who controls the monopoly short of a violation of the antitrust laws.
The public interest served by the patent laws is to stimulate
the invention of new products and processes by giving an opportunity for monopoly profits from the patented article.12 Here there
may be no one who is stimulated to further invention. The licensor
will gain income for the period of his existing patents and during
the period of every improvement patent. The licensee has an in11 E.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Motion
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). In the principal
case the Court disregarded the fact that in TransWrap the ideas were to be unpatented
when turned over to the licensor and it was only through the failure of the licensee to
live up to its bargain that patents had already been issued.
12 "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." U.S. CoNsr., art. I, §8, cl. 8.
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terest in lowering his costs at present by improving the basic patent
but has a stronger interest in not making improvements because
every improvement lengthens the time during which it will be
necessary to be licensed. Since it is practically impossible to continue making any product for ten to fifteen years without improving it, the licensee may never be able to get out of the circle and
still stay in the industry.13 By giving this additional power to the
patentee, the court may have increased the incentive to produce
basic inventions, but it would seem that this same incentive, if
desired, would be better achieved through a lengthening of the
patent monopoly by Congress.

Relation to Antitrust Laws
Legitimate Uses for Grant-Back. The use to which a particular
business device is put will often determine whether it will be held
to be in violation of the antitrust laws. Trans Wrap well illustrates
the uses to which a patentee may legitimately wish to put a patent
grant-back. The license was for a period of ten years, thereafter
renewable for further periods of five years. Upon certain named
contingencies (bankruptcy of the licensee, etc.) the license was to
terminate. The expectation was that if the license did terminate
the licensor would itself then resume producing the patented article. It was important to the licensor that it be assured that if it
resumed manufacturing the patented article the article would be
competitive. This would only be possible if it were to take over
the improved product. This is also true if a licensor continues to
produce the patented article under its basic patent and also licenses
others. The licensor will not wish to lose out on improvements
made by the licensees, not because it is desirous of controlling the
industry with its patent block, but because it wishes to continue to
compete with its licensees in the production of the patented article.
If the licensee is able to use the licensor's patents, it seems only fair
to allow the licensor to demand that he be allowed to use the
13 If the grant-back was to be an assignment, the basic patentee would become owner
of the improvement patents as well. In addition, if the basic patentee licensed numerous
licensees all of whom agreed to grant-back licenses with right to sublicense, each licensee
would be able to use its own improvement patents but would still need to secure licenses
of the improvements patented by the other licensees. Although they could secure licenses
from each patentee individually, as a practical matter they would undoubtedly go to the
basic patentee who could license substantially all of the industry's patents at one time.
It is only where there is but one licensee of the basic patentee giving a license grant-back
(or such a small number as to make feasible the securing of licenses of improvement
patents from each other individually) that the licensee will eventually be able to produce
without license from the basic patentee.
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licensee's improvements. Similarly, if a decree requires compulsory licensing, then it may be felt that the patentee should be
allowed to demand grant-backs of improvement patents or the
licensees will be in the extraordinary position of being able to get
all of the advantages of the licensor's inventiveness and yet be able
to keep its own improvements for its own advantage.14 In a given
fact situation this might even lead to the licensee achieving a
monopoly position in an industry.

Type of Grant-Back. It was not necessary for the TransWrap
licensor to secure an assignment of the improvement patents in
order to protect itself. The only legitimate purpose of the grantback was to enable the licensor to manufacture and license the improved machine if it were necessary for him to resume production.
A nonexclusive license grant-back with power in the licensee to
license others would have been sufficient protection. To the extent
the improvement grant-back exceeded this standard the assignments served no legitimate ends. The potential control over an
industry afforded by assignment grant-backs far exceeds the control
afforded by nonexclusive licenses with power to sublicense.15
The cases have not expressly recognized this distinction. They
have at times not even mentioned what rights under the improvement patents were to be granted back.16 Only in United States v.
General Electric Co. (carboloy)17 is it suggested that an exclusive
license is more conducive to antitrust violation than a nonexclusive license. The interesting fact is that assignment grant-backs
have been approved in the cases more often than not,1 8 while license
grant-backs have more often than not been disapproved.19 The
14 United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 at 360 (1947); United States v.
General Electric Co., (D.C. N.J. 1953) 115 F. Supp. 835.
15 See REPORT 228, 229.
16 United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, (S.D. N.Y. 1952) 105 F. Supp. 215
at 232; Houdry Process Corp. v. Sinclair Refining Co., (E.D. Pa. 1954) 121 F. Supp. 320.
17 (S.D. N.Y. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 989 at 1005. Earlier in the opinion, at 1000, Judge
Knox said that the licenses were nonexclusive. With one exception the court does not
explain why the nonexclusive licenses were in effect exclusive. See 17 UNIV. CHr. L. REv.
357, 367-369 (1950).
18 Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945) (partially allowed in
decree); Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes &: Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947) (not
illegal per se); Stokes &: Smith Co. v. Transparent-Wrap Machine Co., (2d Cir. 1947)
161 F. (2d) 565 (on remand for antitrust finding); Modern Art Printing Co. v. Skeels,
(D.C. N.J. 1954) 123 F. Supp. 426 at 433, revd. on other grounds (3d Cir. 1955) 223 F.
(2d) 719. Contra, United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, (S.D. N.Y. 1952) 105
F. Supp. 215.
19 United States v. National Lead Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1945) 63 F. Supp. 513 at 518
(exclusive license); United States v. General Electric Co. (carboloy), (S.D. N.Y. 1948)
80 F. Supp. 989 at 1005 (see note 17 supra); United States v. General Electric Co., (D.C.
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explanation is that rarely can a monopoly be fashioned out of grantbacks alone. It is just coincidence that those cases in which the
overall pattern lead to an antitrust violation included a license
grant-back, while in those cases in which there was no antitrust
violation there was an assignment grant-back. All other things
being equal, an assignment grant-back is more likely to be found
violative of the antitrust laws than a license grant-back.

Scope of Grant-Back. Normally the grant-back clause is limited
to improvements in the licensed product or process. Occasionally
a grant-back clause will extend to all future patents in the licensed
field and could conceivably extend to all of the licensee's patents.
It is not sufficient to look just to the wor4s of the license to determine the scope of the grant-back, however. If the patent is basic
to the industry, an improvement grant-back will still bring in all
of the new patents, while a requirement of a grant-back of all new
patents in a field would have little meaning if the field was restricted to some insignificant product or process.
While no case has held that a grant-back was illegal solely because of its scope, two cases point strongly in that direction. In
United States v. General Electric Go. (lamps) 20 the "B" licensees
were required to grant-back nonexclusive licenses with a right to
sublicense all of their present patents on incandescent light bulbs
and those patents which they subsequently acquired. The court
found that General Electric used its position as holder of the basic
patents to gain control of the improvements, and that it was engaged
in a systematic funnelling of the industry's patents into its own
hands. The court found that the main buttress of General Electric' s position in the incandescent lamp industry was based on its
patent position. The right to sublicense gave General Electric virtual ownership of the major portion of the patents in the industry.
Undoubtedly if the grant-back had been limited to improvements
N.J. 1949) 82 F. Supp. 753 at 815 (nonexclusive with right to sublicense); United States
v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76 (1950) (reciprocal license in decree denied);
United States v. Aluminum Company of America, (S.D. N.Y. 1950) 91 F. Supp. 333 at
409 (nonexclusive with right to sublicense); United States v. General Electric Co. Qamps),
(D.C. N.J. 1953) 115 F. Supp. 835 Qicense grant-back in decree denied as to existing
patents but allowed as to "future patents"). Contra: United States v. National Lead Co.,
332 U.S. 319 (1947) (nonexclusive license grant-back allowed in decree); United States
v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours &: Co., (D.C. Del. 1953) 118 F. Supp. 41 at 224, affd. 351
U.S. 377 (1956); United States v. International Business Machines Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1956)
CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 1[68,245 (nonexclusive license grant-back allowed in consent decree);
United States v. }Vestern Electric Co., (D.C. N.J. 1956) CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 1[68,246
(nonexclusive license grant-back allowed in consent decree).
20

(D.C. N.J. 1953) 115 F. Supp. 835.
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on the specific patents licensed, there would still have been found
an antitrust violation because of General Electric's dominant position in the industry. But the fact that General Electric demanded
virtual ownership of every patent concerning incandescent lamps
served to emphasize its monopolistic intentions.

In United States v. National Lead Co.21 the grant-back extended
to all of the patents in the titanium pigment industry. The trial
court found that the clause was part of a scheme to eliminate competition in the industry through control of the patents but did not
state what features of the clause were the offensive ones. A court in
a later case distinguished the grant-back clause before it from
the one in National Lead by pointing out that National Lead's
clause extended to all of the patents in the titanium pigment field. 22
Even if, as seems likely, the clause was illegal in part because
of its scope, the court in National Lead does not condemn a broad
clause per se, for the decree provided that the defendants might
condition their licenses on a reciprocal license of any and all patents covering titanium pigments or their manufacture acquired by
the licensees within five years of the date of the decree.
The clause in United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours b
Co. extended only to improvements to the basic moistureproof
cellophane patent. The court pointed out that only nine patents
had in fact been granted back because of the clause. This factor
was one of several in du Pont's licensing policy all of which pointed
to the conclusion that du Pont was not using its patent position to
monopolize the moistureproof cellophane industry, nor had du
Pont's position in the industry been enhanced in any way due to
the grant-back clause in the cellophane licenses.
As the scope of the grant-back widens, the chance that it is
being used by the licensor solely to effect a legitimate purpose
lessens. No longer is the licensor who has ceased production relying
on royalty income, as in TransWrapJ merely assured that if the
licensee defaults, it will be able to resume production with a
competitive product. Nor is the licensor merely assuring itself that
it will be able to produce as improved a product under the basic
patent as any of its licensees. The effect of the broad grant-back is
to assure the licensor that it will have as good a product in the
23

21 332 U.S. 319
22 United States

(1947).
v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., (D.C. Del. 1953) ll8 F. Supp.
41, affd. 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
23Ibid.
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industry as any of its licensees, whether the product was made
under the basic patent or by another process. There is no longer
the risk that a competitor, if the competitor is a licensee, will develop a competing product or process which will leave the licensor
in a non-competitive position. However, since there is no requirement that other firms in the industry will receive licenses to use the
new products or processes, the licensor may find itself in the position of being the only firm in the industry assured of the use of a
substantial portion of the new inventions of the industry. Although
the reasoning of the Trans Wrap case prevents any grant-back clause
from being found illegal per se, the use of a clause with a broad
scope should alert a court to the possibility that the clause may be
part of a broader picture of antitrust violation.

Duration of Grant-Back Right. Typically the licensee must
grant back licenses or assignments during the period of the basic
license, the granted-back licenses or assignments to continue for
the life of the improvement patent. In only one case has the duration of the period over which the licensee must grant back been
significant. In the National Lead decree 24 compulsory licensing
was ordered of all existing patents and all patents to be acquired
within the five years following the decree covering titanium pigments or their manufacture. At the same time the defendants were
permitted to require a license grant-back of all similar patents of
the licensee presently issued or to be issued during the same five
years. The court was not consciously thinking of the effect of a
grant-back clause extending for more than five years but was only
trying to be fair to the defendants.
To date the cases indicate that if the grant-back clause operates
over the period of the basic patent, no particular significance will
be attributed to its duration. Nevertheless, the court should always
consider the practical effect of a grant-back clause operating for a
period up to seventeen years. Even though the clause may have
been originally intended merely to protect the licensor's interest in
the basic patent, and therefore may be considered a legitimate use
for the clause, the industry may find that a clause extending over
such an extended period has the practical effect of funnelling a
significant portion of the new developments of the industry into
the control of the licensor. If the consequence of this funnelling
action is to contribute to market domination by the licensor or
unreasonably to reduce the incentive to research by the licensees,
2¼ United

States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
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the court should consider the duration of the clause to be of significance in evaluating its lawfulness. It follows, therefore, that a
clause which lasts for a period shorter than the length of the basic
patent, and which has a correspondingly lesser effect on the licensees and the industry should be less likely to be found illegal. Similarly, a clause which lasts for a period longer than the life of the
basic patent, and which has a correspondingly greater effect on the
licensees and the industry should be more likely to be found illegal.
Any deviation from the norm is apt to have some significance in
showing whether the licensor intended to use the grant-back clause
to help gain a dominant role in the industry even though the clause
may not have played a major role.

Market Position. On the remand of TransWrap the circuit
court of appeals treated with the utmost respect the order of the
Supreme Court that grant-backs were not illegal per se.25 The
argument of the licensee that the grant-back gave the licensor a
"double monopoly" 26 because the licensor now had two patents
where before it had only one would be true of every assignment
grant-back, and if this "double monopoly" were found to be a violation of the antitrust laws, every assignment grant-back would be
illegal per se. The court used a different rationale. It correctly
pointed out that during the period of the basic patent the "double
monopoly" was one in name only. The article could be manufactured only on license from the basic patentee. The basic patentee's
power to license was not increased21 and only the improvement
patentee's negative command of the art was lost. After the basic
patent expired only the improvement patents were left. The bare
ownership of improvement patents did not raise a violation of the
antitrust laws. The court pointed out that the record showed no
lessening of the competitive situation in the industry. Even if some
of the improvement patents covered machines which were not covered by the licensor's basic patent, all that would be shown is that
the licensor had extended his control over the industry. But only
extensions of control which are unreasonable restraints of commerce are illegal. In using this reasoning the court was further
extending the Supreme Court's decision that an assignment grantback was not illegal per se. The Supreme Court's language was
25 Stokes

& Smith Co. v. Transparent-Wrap Machine Co., (2d Cir. 1947) 161 F. (2d) 565.
26These words were first used by Justice Douglas in Transparent-Wrap Machine
Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637 at 646.
27 It should be noted, however, that it will often be easier to secure new licensees
for the improved product than it would have been for the unimproved product.
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used to refute only the claim that there had been a patent misuse
because of an assignment grant-back. Since a grant-back clause by
itself will almost never produce monopoly conditions in an industry, the courts have declared a grant-back to be a violation of the
antitrust laws only when it has been part of an overall scheme to
control the industry.
The defendants in National Lead produced practically 100 percent of the American titanium pigments. The balance was produced by two licensees of the defendants, both of whom were under
production, territorial and pricing restrictions. In addition they
were compelled to grant back exclusive licenses on all improvement
patents which they developed in the licensed field. This whole
picture of monopoly control through the use of patents was found
to be illegal. In 1948, in United States v. General Electric Co.
(carboloy),28 Judge Knox made clear the effect of the market position on the legality of a grant-back, a point which had been inherent, but not expressed, in the previous decisions.
"The trade position of the present defendants closely approximates that of the defendants in the National Lead case,
and not that which is found in the Transparent-Wrap case.
The employment of basic patents, or patents which may be
basic, to compel the transfer of future patent rights, is condemned per se, when practiced on a scale such as is found in
this suit. " 29
Similarly, General Electric's dominant position in the incandescent lamp industry was due to its patent policies, including the use
of grant-back clauses.30 The court found that Gene:ral Electric followed a conscious policy of funnelling into its control all of the
patents of its licensees having to do with the industry.
The grant-back provision was also found illegal in United States
v. Imperial Chemical Industries. Defendants were the dominant
firms in the nylon industry, and the court found that the grant-back
clause in question "perpetuate[d] control of the product, after expiration of the basic patent, for an unlawful use-the division of
territories in restraint of United States trade." 31
An interesting example of the effects of a grant-back clause
when the licensor is the dominant firm in the industry is illustrated
by United States v. Aluminum Company of America.32 The grant2s (S.D. N.Y. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 989.
29 Id.

at 1006.

80 United States v.
81 (S.D. N.Y. 1952)
82 (S.D. N.Y. 1950)

General Electric Co. (lamps),
105 F. Supp. 215 at 232.
91 F. Supp. 333 at 409, 4ll.

(D.C. N.J. 1953) II5 F. Supp. 8!15.
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back was of a nonexclusive license with right to sublicense. There
were only two competitors of Alcoa, Kaiser and Reynolds. When
either Kaiser or Reynolds patented an improvement, Alcoa was
able to use it as well, but the other competitor could not. The only
solution for Kaiser and Reynolds would be to cross-license each
other, but if this were the case, there would be no particular reason
to spend money on research-it would be less costly to leave this to
Alcoa. The court found that there was evidence of such reasoning
on Kaiser and Reynold's part, for in 1949 Alcoa had 762 employees
in research while Kaiser and Reynolds combined had 88.
It must always be remembered that it is not the market control
of the defendant firm which determines the legality of the clause,
however, but the effect which a given grant-back clause has on the
market control. Judge Learned Hand's test based on the reasonableness of the restraint of trade induced by the clause33 is still the
law today. This test has been rec;:ently used in United States v. E. I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., where there was no showing that as
a result of the agreement du Pont's position was in any way enhanced, or that others who might have desired a license were precluded from entering the field, 34 and in Modern Art Printing Co.
v. Skeels,85 where a defense to a patent infringement suit based on
a grant-back clause was dismissed because the court found no evidence pertaining to the effect of the clause on the industry.

Decrees
Once the defendant has been found guilty of an antitrust violation, the burden is on the defendant to show that the proposed
decree is overly harsh and unnecessary. 86 Since the decree is intended only to prevent future abuse and not to punish for past
transgressions, if the court finds that the industry's situation warrants the use of grant-backs, it can allow their use. In fact grantbacks have been allowed directly in one case and have been allowed
by indirection in another.87 The National Lead38 decree allowed
88 Stokes

& Smith Co. v. Transparent-Wrap Machine Co., (2d Cir. 1947) 161 F. (2d) 565.
(D.C. Del. 1953) 118 F. Supp. 41 at 224.
(D.C. N.J. 1954) 123 F. Supp. 426, revd. on other grounds (3d Cir. 1955) 223 F.
(2d) 719.
86 Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945); United States v. Aluminum Company of America, (S.D. N.Y. 1950) 91 F. Supp. 333.
87 Grant-backs have also been allowed at least in consent decrees. United States v.
International Business Machines Corp., (S.D. N.Y. 1956) CCH Trade Reg. Rep. ,r68,245;
United States v. Western Electric Co., (D.C. N.J. 1956) CCH Trade Reg. Rep. i!68,246.
88 United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
84
85
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for a grant-back clause where compulsory licensing was decreed of
all patents then issued or to be issued within the next five years.
There were only two expected licensees and each of them was in a
position whereby if they were allowed to secure licenses to all of
the defendants' patents but were not required to grant back reciprocal rights, conceivably the licensees would change places with the
defendants in becoming the dominant factor in the industry.
Prior to the TransWrap case the Supreme Court had occasion
to deal with a grant-back clause in Hartford-Empire Co. v. United
States.39 The lower court decree enjoined Hartford-Empire from
providing that rights to improvements and inventions covering
licensed machinery or processes or methods were to become the
exclusive property of the lessor or vendor. Upon appeal to the
Supreme Court the government conceded that grant-back provisions were not illegal per se and that the injunction went beyond
the field illegally monopolized. Without discussion the Court
amended the decree to permit the inclusion of a grant-back clause
in all licenses except certain glassmaking machinery. This case was
a logical forerunner to TransWrap in that it recognized the validity of grant-backs in general but looked to the effect the particular
clause would have on the industry.
The single pervading thread of consistency in the decrees which
have not allowed a grant-back clause is that the court felt that a
grant-back clause would be detrimental to the restoration of competition in the industry. The courts have done their best not to harm
defendants unnecessarily by the decrees. 40 Only in United States
v. Aluminum Company of America41 and in the General Electric
lamp decree42 were companies required to grant a free license in
which no grant-back was allowed. Alcoa's licenses themselves were
39 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
40 In United States v.

General Electric Co. (lamps), (D.C. N.J. 1953) 115 F. Supp.
835, the court indicated that the reason for not allowing a grant-back clause although
compulsory licensing was decreed was to put General Electric at a competitive disadvantage. General Electric had so many natural advantages over its competitors that only
by allowing its competitors to demand royalty free licenses from General Electric on
General Electric's existing patents without allowing General Electric to demand licenses
on its competitors' patents could competition be restored to the industry. While it seemed
advisable to require General Electric to license all applicants for General Electric patents
developed within five years of the decree, it did not seem necessary to prevent it from
asking for licenses from an applicant in return.
41 (S.D. N.Y. 1950) 91 F. Supp. 333. Other decrees in which no grant-back was
allowed but in which the defendant was allowed to charge reasonable royalties for the
compulsory license are United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 at 360 (1947);
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76 at 100 (1950); United States v.
Imperial Chemical Industries, (S.D. N.Y. 1952) 105 F. Supp. 215 at 232; United States v.
General Electric Co. (lamps), (D.C. N.J. 1953) 115 F. Supp. 835.
42 See note 40 supra.
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royalty free but had a grant-back clause. The grant-back clause
was declared unenforceable. But the court was very careful to
point out the adverse effects which the grant-back clause had had
and the probable effects which its retention would have. An argument was raised as to the constitutionality of the decree which
declared the licenses royalty-free but did not allow the grant-back
clause. The court did not feel that it was necessary to pass upon
the question, however, for Alcoa had previously argued that the
grant-back provisions were of small importance in its patent policy
and that the reason for Alcoa's royalty-free licensing was to improve competitive conditions in the industry. To say now that the
elimination of the grant-back clause was such a deprivation of
property as to be unconstitutional was to place Alcoa in a bad light
in regard to its overall patent policy.

Conclusion
When a patentee wishes to issue licenses containing a grantback clause he has to go through the same type of analysis which
a court must go through when called upon to evaluate the legality
of such a clause. But whereas the court is interested only in the
overall effect of the clause, the licensor must also decide upon the
particular terms of the clause. He must determine whether the
grant-back shall be of a license-exclusive or nonexclusive-or
whether it shall be an assignment. He must determine how broad
the grant-back shall be, i.e., whether it shall demand merely improvements on the basic patent, all future patents in the field, or
some middle ground, and he must decide during what period of
time the clause will operate. The two criteria by which he should
decide these questions are the minimum terms which will give him
the legitimate protection which he desires, and the effect the clause
will have on the licensees and the industry. It is reasonable to believe that often the licensor is not governed by these two limitations, however, but rather by a third limitation inherent to business, viz., the relative bargaining power of the licensor and the
licensee. This limitation is apt to be of little help, however, for in
a situation where licensees have sufficient bargaining power to resist
the demands of the licensor, there is little chance that the most
flagrant grant-back clause will bring about monopoly conditions.
Although the court is not primarily interested in the individual
terms of the clause but in the net effect of the clause on the licensor,
licensees and the industry, an analysis of the individual terms will
often show the real purpose and effect of the clause. It has been
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suggested that in some cases a clause may help to induce competition in the industry. For example, the grant-back of a nonexclusive
license, especially with authority to sublicense, may diffuse the
benefits to all licensees and thus tend to encourage competitive use
of the innovations.43 However that may be, the court should look
to the purpose and effect of the clause in the context of the industry
situation to determine the legality of the clause. It should be determined what the effect of the clause is on the licensor vis-a-vis the
licensees and the industry, as well as what the effect of the clause
is on the licensees vis-a-vis the licensor, the other licensees44 and the
rest of the industry, and also what the effect of the clause is on the
incentive to engage in research and to disseminate the fruits of such
research on the part of the licensor, the licensees, and the remainder
of the industry.
The small patentee who wishes to protect himself in the future
production of the patented article by use of a grant-back clause is
in little danger of being charged with an antitrust violation. It is
only the big firm in the industry which has had an aggressive patent
policy which is apt to have its grant-back clauses found illegal.
Even in that case, however, a grant-back clause need not cause
trouble if the clause is restricted to the minimum terms needed for
protection of the basic patent.
Eric E. Bergsten, S.Ed.
43 REPORT 229, but see note 44 infra.
44 See Diggins, "The Patent-Antitrust Problem,''

53 MICH. L. REv. 1093 at 1098 (1955).
"Again it would seem that a further point should be added. Grant-backs may also
affect a licensee's competitive position vis-a-vis other licensees especially where the grantback includes the right to sublicense. In a situation such as that in the General Electric
Lamp Case [82 F. Supp. 753] the grant-back of a license to General Electric by a small
licensee such as Chicago Miniature Lamp Company and the extension of that license
to a larger licensee such as Westinghouse may adversely affect the competitive position
of Chicago Miniature with respect to Westinghouse independently of other effects."

